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IN THE QUIET OF THE MONASTERY
Buddhist Controversies over Quietism
Bernard Faure
The expression “Buddhist quietism” is a familiar one. At first glance, it seems 
anachronistic, inasmuch as the word Quietism —  at least, when written with the 
uppercase Q —  refers to a quite specific phenomenon: a form of mysticism that 
developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the writings of 
Miguel de Molinos and Madame Guyon. Thus, if it is to be used at all in a Bud-
dhist context, the word should refer to a teaching that bears some resemblance to 
the doctrine of these Christian mystics. Quietism usually refers, in the Christian 
context, to a withdrawal from the world into a state of blissful and inactive contem-
plation or, more radically, into a relationship or even union with God that exempts 
the adept from any religious practice or moral concern. Of course, in the case of 
Buddhism, there is, in the strict sense, no question of surrender to a transcendent 
God. In some cases, however —  for instance, in the cult of the Buddha Amita¯bha 
(or Amida) —  the Buddha may function almost as a monotheistic God, and Bud-
dhist observances can call to mind Christian devotion or Indian bhakti. From the 
perspective of affectivity, Shinran’s concept of salvation through pure faith in the 
Buddha Amida might be regarded as quietistic; likewise the “dancing recitation of 
Amida’s name” that Kuya Sho¯nin (d. 972) spread among Japanese Buddhists.
Was the Buddha himself a quietist? It is difficult to say, since all we have 
is a legend. Clearly no single term, not even one as broad as quietism, could do 
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25justice to a religious phenomenon as complex as Buddhism, but could the term 
at least be said to characterize certain of the Buddhist schools? Chan (Zen) Bud-
dhism, in particular, is often described as quietistic —  though also, conversely, it 
is described as a Buddhist response to the quietist temptation. To determine how 
such complexity or confusion has come about will require us to consider, if only 
briefly, the history of the Western reception of Buddhism.
1. Western Critics of Buddhist Quietism
Soon after the brief flourishing in Europe of the doctrines of Molinos and 
Madame Guyon, the term quietist came to be used by Jesuit missionaries in Asia 
and by their correspondents at home to denounce various aspects of Buddhism. 
Meanwhile, the Jesuits in Europe had a more nuanced attitude toward Christian 
Quietism and even occasionally supported it for political reasons. Ignatius of 
Loyola himself is said to have embraced the practice of “spiritual indifference” 
associated with Quietism.1
When applied to Buddhism, the term quietist resonates with negative con-
notations that are best understood in light of the controversy over Christian Qui-
etism. In most cases, this critique of Buddhism was aimed at enemies back home. 
The French Protestant Pierre Bayle, in the article “Brahman” in his Diction-
naire historique et critique (1697), amalgamated Buddhism with Quietism, noting 
that Buddhism was criticized by Confucianists much as Fénelon’s Quietism was 
criticized by La Bruyère. Bayle compared the “extravagant” style of the West-
ern mystics to that of the “speculative Chinese” but also conflated the quietism 
of Chan Buddhists with “the doctrine of Spinoza.”2 Bayle found Confucianism 
likewise comparable to Spinozan philosophy and referred to Confucius himself 
as the “Spinoza of the Far East.” The writings of Spinoza were the real target of 
much criticism leveled at Chinese (and, by extension, Japanese) philosophy and 
religion at the time.3
Quietism also came to be associated with nihilism. According to the Jesuit 
Jean-Baptiste du Halde, the “inner doctrine” advocated by Chinese Buddhists 
(and, more specifically, by Chan monks) was that “a vacuum or Nothing is the 
Principle of all Things, that from this our first Parents had their Origin, and 
to this they returned after their Death.”4 Du Halde goes on to explain how this 
ontological notion leads to a sort of quietism:
1. See Mita Choudhury, “A Betrayal of Trust: The Jesuits 
and Quietism in Eighteenth- Century France,” Common 
Knowledge 15.2 (Spring 2009): 164 – 80.
2. See The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter 
Bayle, 2nd ed. (London: J. J. and P. Knapton, 1734 – 38).
3. For more on this topic, see Bernard Faure, “Chan/
Zen in the Western Imagination,” in Chan Insights and 
Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the Chan Tradi-
tion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
15 – 51.
4. Jean- Baptiste du Halde, The General History of China: 
Containing a Geographical, Historical, Chronological, Politi-
cal, and Physical Description of the Empire of China, Chinese-
 Tartary, Corea, and Thibet, 4 vols., trans. Richard Brookes 


















5. Du Halde, General History of China, 3:51.
6. Du Halde, General History of China, 3:52.
7. Engelbert Kaempfer, Histoire naturelle, civile et ecclesias-
tique de l’Empire du Japon, 3 vols. (Hague: P. Gausse and 
J. Neaulme, 1732), 2:61. See also Béatrice M. Bodart- Bailey, 
ed., Kaempfer’s Japan: Tokugawa Culture Observed (Hono-
lulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999), 178.
8. On this question, see Richard Welbon, The Buddhist 
Nirvana and Its Western Interpreters (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1968); Roger- Pol Droit, The Cult of 
Nothingness: The Philosophers and the Buddha, trans. David 
Streight and Pamela Vohnson (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003).
To live happily we must continually strive by Meditation, and frequent 
Victories over ourselves, to become like this Principium, and to this end 
accustom ourselves to do nothing, to desire nothing, to perceive noth-
ing, to think on nothing; there is no Dispute about Vices or Virtues, 
Rewards or Punishments, Providence and the Immortality of the Soul; 
all Holiness consists in ceasing to be, and to be swallowed up by Noth-
ing; the nearer we approach to the nature of a Stone, or the Trunk of a 
Tree, the more perfect we are; in short it is in Indolence and Inactivity, 
in a Privation of every Motion of the Body, in an Annihilation of all the 
Faculties of the Soul, and in the general Suspension of all Thought, that 
Virtue and Happiness consist; when a Man has once attained this happy 
State he will then meet with no further Vicissitudes and Transmigra-
tions, he has nothing to fear for the Future, because properly speaking 
he is Nothing; or if he is any thing he is happy, and to say every thing in 
one word he is perfectly like the God Fo.5
In their denunciation of Buddhist quietism, Christian missionaries found 
powerful allies in the neo- Confucian literati (whom they call the “Learned”):
However, the greatest part of the Learned have opposed this Sect . . . ; 
they attack’d it with all their Might, proving that this Apathy, or rather 
this monstrous Stupidity, overturned all Morality and Civil Society; 
that Man is raised only above other Beings by his thinking and reason-
ing Faculties, and by his Application to the Knowledge and Practice of 
Virtue; that to aspire after this foolish Inactivity is renouncing the most 
essential Duties, abolishing the necessary Relation of Father and Son, 
Husband and Wife, Prince and Subject, and that if this Doctrine was 
follow’d it would reduce all the Members of a State to a Condition much 
inferior to that of Beasts.6
The description of Chan meditation as quietistic was taken over —  albeit with fewer 
negative connotations —  by Engelbert Kaempfer, who visited Japan as “physician to 
the Dutch embassy.” In his History of Japan (1690 – 92), Kaempfer describes “sasen” 
(zazen, sitting meditation) as “a profound meditation of divine mysterious and holy 
things; which so entirely takes up a man’s mind, that his body lies, as it were, desti-
tute of all sense and life, unmoved by any external object whatsoever.”7
The allegation of Buddhist nihilism continued to inspire vitriolic pages in 
























27from China, one of the most vociferous critics of Buddhism, Jules Barthélémy 
Saint- Hilaire, interpreted Chan quietism as a stepping stone toward annihilation: 
“The doctrine of Dhyâna may therefore be considered a decisive commentary on 
that of Nirvana; for, as by this transitory ecstatic state a transitory annihilation 
is already sought, so an eternal and definite annihilation may be sought in Nir-
vana.”9 Saint- Hilaire thought it his duty to describe at length this “hideous faith,” 
which “shed such light on the destinies of the Asiatic world.”10
Another object of the Jesuits’ attack on quietism was the Indian monk 
Bodhidharma, the legendary founder of the Chan school, who was said to have 
“come from the West” (that is, from India). His importance in Western discourse 
stems basically from a misunderstanding: the first Jesuit missionaries, impressed 
by superficial resemblances between Buddhism and Christianity, read his Chi-
nese name (Damo or Tamo) as a distorted rendition of “Thomas” and so initially 
saw in him the apostle Thomas, the legendary evangelizer of the Indies. When 
it became clear that Bodhidharma was not Thomas, the missionaries, apparently 
oblivious of their earlier enthusiasm for this solitary figure, sharply criticized him 
for quietism. Jean- Baptiste du Halde, for instance, wrote of Bodhidharma:
This Tamo, the Person so cried up, who is come out of the West into 
China, passed as they say nine years in the Mountain Tsong [Song 
shan] in continual contemplation; he continued immoveable with his 
Eyes fixed upon the Wall, without changing his situation, and yet this 
contemplative Sluggard wanted none of the Necessaries of Life, but 
had a plentiful Supply of all sorts of Provisions and Clothes: Suppose, 
after his Example, every private Person should take it in their Heads 
to imitate this kind of Life, what would become of the most necessary 
Professions? Who could take care of cultivating the Fields, and make 
the useful Products of the Loom? Whence would they have Garments, 
and Food to support Life? Can it be imagin’d that a Doctrine whose 
Practice, if it were universal, would put the Empire in Confusion should 
be the true Doctrine?11
This association of Chan with quietism has proved surprisingly resilient. In 
the early twentieth century, the Belgian Jesuit Léon Wieger (“our indefatigable 
Sinologist”) held that Bodhidharma was not even a Buddhist and that the type of 
meditation he had advocated proved to be a fraud leading to moral corruption:
Now Bodhidharma rejected the recitations also, which were useless 
according to his opinion. Prohibiting all the books and all study, he 
set up the sole principle, of personal and individual buddhification, by 
9. Jules Barthélémy Saint- Hilaire, The Buddha and His 
Religion (London: Routledge, 1895), 144.
10. Saint- Hilaire, Buddha and His Religion, 144 – 45.

















8 a kind of contemplation of his interior, which I will call endovision. . . .  
That contemplation without theme, without process, not methodical 
like that of the Mahayanist . . . , but purely intuitive, ought to form the 
only preoccupation of the aspirant to perfection. It was to that, that 
Bodhidharma applied himself uninterruptedly during his last years. It 
was in practising it that he died. Now, such contemplation cannot be 
sustained, as an intellectual act. The only result that it can produce, if 
it is practised seriously, is idiocy. And if it is not practiced seriously, that 
mental idleness leads fatally to immorality.12
A more understanding account of Bodhidharma’s teaching came, in roughly 
the same period, from Sir Reginald F. Johnston, a Scottish academic and diplo-
mat, resident in China: “It is this Indian sage, this searcher of hearts and scorner 
of books, who is regarded as the founder, in China, of the Ch’an or Contempla-
tive school of Buddhism. ‘You will not find Buddha in images or books,’ was the 
teaching of the venerable Tamo. ‘Look into your own heart: that is where you 
will find Buddha.’ ”13 According to Johnston, “Tamo’s system has been described 
as ‘the Buddhist counterpart of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola’; 
but there are other Christian saints and mystics with whom he may be compared 
even more fittingly.”14 Nevertheless, Johnston still held that “there is reason to 
suspect that some monks who believed themselves to have attained the exalted 
state of mystical union were apt to confuse that state with the less honorable 
condition of physical somnolence.”15
One of the most common criticisms made concerns Buddhism’s alleged 
escapism, its sociopolitical quietism. This criticism was made repeatedly by the 
neo- Confucianists, who regarded Buddhist monks as parasites. This caricature 
cast a long shadow. In his praise of the Jesuit Antoine Possovino (b. 1553), the 
literary critic René Etiemble, for example, wrote: “He understood very well . . . 
that Buddhism . . . is a religion based on mysticism; that this mysticism, as it 
often, if not always, happens, incites man to a kind of quietism; lastly, that Bud-
dhism could well constitute one of the metamorphoses, one of the avatars, of 
atheism.”16 Etiemble criticizes Zen’s quietism or “will to powerlessness” and its 
evil social effects, contrasting it with the active moral and political involvement 
of the enlightened mind (in the Western sense): “Someone like Voltaire requires 
answers on the Calas scandal or the Audin scandal. A Zenist, on the other hand, 
enters into Zen: like some animals that, when frightened, enter into catalepsy, he 
12. Léon Wieger, A History of the Religious Beliefs and Phil-
osophical Opinions in China from the Beginning to the Present 
Time, trans. Edward Chalmers Werner (1927; New York: 
Paragon, 1969), 254.
13. Sir Reginald Fleming Johnston, Buddhist China (Lon-
don: John Murray, 1913), 83.
14. Johnston, Buddhist China, 84 – 85.
15. Johnston, Buddhist China, 86.


























9chooses that happy state in which life can no longer be distinguished from death, 
nor untruth from truth. What a fine thing Zen is!”17
2. The Dialectic of Chan/Zen Quietism
To understand this shared critique of Buddhism, on the part of Jesuits and Con-
fucianists, requires some understanding as well that, just as the Jesuits in China 
borrowed arguments against Buddhism from their neo- Confucian allies, so too 
was the Confucian critique of Buddhism indebted to arguments that had been 
directed by Buddhist schools against one another. Certain Chan schools had 
indeed accused each other of quietism, and Western scholars in the later twenti-
eth century have likewise taken sides in these disputes.
Consider, for instance, the differing views taken by Paul Demiéville and 
J.- R. Armogathe on the divisions within Buddhism. The so- called Council of 
Tibet, at which the Indian master Kamalas´ ı¯la and the Chinese (Chan) master 
Moheyan debated the value of their respective understandings of Maha¯ya¯na Bud-
dhism, was termed “a controversy over quietism” by Demiéville in an erudite 
book , Le Concile de Lhasa: Une controverse sur le quiétisme entre bouddhistes de l’Inde 
et de la Chine au VIIIe siècle de l’ère chrétienne (1952).18 This debate took place at the 
end of the eighth century at the Samye monastery in central Tibet, but the con-
troversy can be traced several decades further back to a controversy over “gradu-
alism” and “subitism” that divided the Chan movement into two factions. The 
“Southern school” followed the Chan master Shenhui after his attack in 732 on 
his Northern rivals. The Southern school and its notion of “sudden awakening” 
later became the Chan orthodoxy, while the Northern school, labeled “gradual-
ist” by Shenhui, was eventually rejected as “collateral.”19 Armogathe, in a 1973 
book on quietism, dealing with non- Western as well as European varieties, refers 
to the “gradual teaching” of the Northern school as quietist because of its alleged 
attachment to meditation, whereas for Demiéville it is the “sudden teaching” of 
the Southern school that merits the quietist label because of its antinomianism.20 
Here we have evidence —  one piece among many —  that quietist is an adjective of 
limited use in describing Chan Buddhism.
17. Etiemble, Connaissons- nous la Chine?, 133.
18. Paul Demiéville, Le Concile de Lhasa: Une controverse 
sur le quiétisme entre bouddhistes de l’Inde et de la Chine au 
VIIIe siècle de l’ère chrétienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1952).
19. See John R. McRae, The Northern School and the For-
mation of Early Ch’an Buddhism (Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press, 1986); and Bernard Faure, The Will to 
Orthodoxy: A Critical Genealogy of Northern Chan Buddhism 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
20. Jean- Robert Armogathe, Le quiétisme, coll. “Que 


















0 The “Case” against Meditation
The main allegation that the neo- Confucianists leveled against Buddhism was 
that the monasticism it sponsored was antisocial. But this criticism was directed 
against monasticism and eremitism in general, rather than against Buddhist 
quiet ism per se. The same reproach has of course been directed often enough 
against Christian eremitism —  for example, in a text quoted by the intellectual 
historian Bernard Groethuysen:
What a strange fanaticism it is to want to convert cities into cloisters, and 
the palaces of princes into places of retirement for recluses! Let us blush 
for all eternity at these excesses, and let us not impute to religion, but to 
the spirit of domination by which most of these extravagant doctors are 
possessed, these maxims that lead only to the destruction of society.21
Still, the denunciation of monastic “retirement” and sociopolitical quietism is 
usually linked to the characteristically Buddhist monastic practice of meditation 
or contemplation, which the neo- Confucianists regarded as overly passive. Both 
influenced by Buddhism and in reaction against it, the neo- Confucianists devel-
oped a less passive form of meditation called jingzuo or “quiet sitting.” But again, 
this same kind of reaction could be found in Chan itself, either as the rebuttal of 
a specific form of Chan practice or as a means of distinguishing Chan meditation 
from the Indian Buddhist practice of dhya¯na.
Buddhist meditation is traditionally characterized as dual in nature —  as a 
delicate balance between a pair of complementary aspects called sama¯dhi (concen-
tration) and prajña¯ (wisdom). The founder of the Tiantai school, Zhiyi (538 – 97), 
attempted to subsume all Buddhist meditative techniques under the binom zhi 
guan (s´a¯matha- vipas´yana¯): the first element, which means “calming,” is regarded as 
more passive, and the second (“discernment” or “examination”) as more active.22 
With the development of the Prajña¯pa¯ramita¯ (Perfection of Wisdom) tradition 
in Maha¯ya¯na, there arose a tendency to give precedence to prajña¯ over dhya¯na, 
wisdom over withdrawal and mental focus. Chan Buddhism, and in particular the 
Southern school of Shenhui, was strongly influenced by that tradition, in which 
prajña¯ is characterized not as a mental clarity akin to vipas´yana¯, but rather as a 
higher, intuitive type of wisdom or gnosis.
This tendency is also found in the Vimalakı¯rti- su¯tra, where the enlightened 
layman Vimalakı¯rti scolds S´a¯riputra, one of the Buddha’s foremost disciples, for 
sitting absorbed in contemplation under a tree:
Reverend S´a¯riputra, this is not the way to absorb yourself in contem-
plation. You should absorb yourself in contemplation so that neither 
21. Bernard Groethuysen, Les Origines de l’esprit bourgeois 
en France (Paris: Gallimard, 1927), 234; translation mine.
22. The type of meditation most popular in the West 
today, Vipassana, emphasizes “mindfulness” and is there-
























31body nor mind appear anywhere in the triple world. You should absorb 
yourself in contemplation in such a way that you can manifest all ordi-
nary behavior without forsaking cessation. You should absorb yourself 
in contemplation in such a way that you can manifest the nature of an 
ordinary person without abandoning your cultivated spiritual nature. 
You should absorb yourself in contemplation so that the mind neither 
settles within nor moves without toward external forms. You should 
absorb yourself in contemplation in such a way that the thirty- seven 
aids to enlightenment are manifest without deviation toward any con-
victions. You should absorb yourself in contemplation in such a way that 
you are released in liberation without abandoning the passions that are 
the province of the world. 23
The kind of contemplation that Vimalakı¯rti favors is a radical departure from 
traditional meditation. Vimalakı¯rti’s criticism of contemplation was amplified 
in Chan Buddhism, which —  in spite of its name, derived from dhya¯na (Chinese 
channa, hence chan) —  came to criticize the quietistic practice of dhya¯na for its 
overreliance on s´amatha (calming, cessation). In Chan, traditional meditation was 
regarded as lacking in dynamism.
A further step along these lines was the Southern Chan notion of wunian 
(“no- thought”). Even when Chan texts advocate kanxin (“looking at the mind”), 
they do not mean the sort of introspection generally called “mindfulness,” since 
the mind in question is wuxin (mindless). The puzzlement created by the new 
Chan emphasis on wunian and wuxin explains the warnings against “cultivating 
blankness of mind, which is quietism,” and explains as well the recurrent advocacy 
of activity (whether physical or mental). While Chan no- thought is said to be pure 
“spontaneity,” the notion was influenced by the Daoist idea of wuwei or “non-
 action,” which is not always clearly distinguishable from mere inaction. Hence 
the charge of quietism, found as early as the Platform Su¯tra of the Sixth Patriarch, 
the supposed autobiography of the Chan master Huineng (d. 713). In this text, 
Huineng admonishes his disciples: “Good friends, some people teach men to sit, 
viewing the mind and viewing purity, not moving and not activating the mind. . . . 
Those who instruct in this way are from the outset greatly mistaken.”24 The Chan 
master Linji Yixuan (d. 867) developed the same theme: “There are a bunch of 
blind shavepates who, having stuffed themselves with food, sit down to meditate 
and practice contemplation. Arresting the flow of thought they don’t let it rise; 
they hate noise and seek stillness. This is the method of heretics.”25
23. See Robert A. F. Thurman, trans., The Holy Teaching 
of Vimalakı¯rti: A Maha¯ya¯na Scripture (Philadelphia: Penn-
sylvania State University Press, 1976), 24.
24. See Philip B. Yampolsky, The Platform Su¯tra of the 
Sixth Patriarch (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1967), 137.
25. See Ruth Fuller Sasaki, trans., and Thomas Kirchner, 



















Not everyone agreed, however, not even in the “sudden Chan” tradition. 
For instance, Guifeng Zongmi (780 –841), a contemporary of Linji, argued that 
the “Vimalakı¯rti- su¯tra says: ‘It is not necessary to sit.’ It does not say, ‘It is neces-
sary not to sit.’ Whether or not to sit [in meditation] depends on what is most 
suited to the capacities of the practitioner.”26 Apparently, Zongmi was trying to 
reestablish the traditional balance between concentration and wisdom, which 
had been upset by Shenhui. While the Linji school emphasized an “active” form 
of meditation focused on “cases” or riddles ( gong’an; Japanese ko¯an), quiet con-
templation remained the characteristic of the Caodong ( Japanese So¯to¯) school. It 
was labeled by its Linji ( Japanese Rinzai) detractors as “silent- illumination Chan” 
( Japanese mokusho¯-zen), in contrast to the “Chan of word- examination” (kanhua-
chan, Japanese kanna-zen) which is the practice based on the study of ko¯ans.27
Like the Jesuit missionaries who argued that the practitioner of Zen medi-
tation aimed to resemble “a stone or the trunk of a tree,” the Chan master Dahui 
Zonggao (1089 – 1163) described silent- illumination Chan as a state of mind simi-
lar to “dead ashes and wood,” and he contrasted it with the active examination 
of ko¯ans as practiced in the Linji (Rinzai) school. The So¯to¯ Zen master Do¯gen 
(1200 – 1253), on the other hand, criticized Rinzai Zen as too goal- oriented and 
therefore dualistic. Instead he advocated the practice of shikan taza (“sitting-
 only”), a nondual meditation that is not a means toward an end, but the goal 
itself —  the natural expression of awakening. In actual practice, however, the con-
trast between the two schools on that point was never as clear- cut as argued, and 
Do¯gen himself is known to have made great use of ko¯ans.
The “Zen apostle” D. T. Suzuki, who first introduced Zen to a Western 
audience, belonged to the Rinzai school and inherited its prejudice against qui-
etistic contemplation. From his perspective, ko¯ans were used primarily to keep 
Zen from degenerating into quietism or into a merely intellectual understanding. 
Suzuki rejected both Northern Chan and So¯to¯ Zen as quietist. Unjustifiably con-
flating quietism and gradualism, he also criticized the former for being “intellec-
tualist.” Modern adepts of Zen, following Suzuki’s interpretation, often empha-
size the role of ko¯ans in keeping Zen free from the temptation of quietism.
Chan (Zen) Antinomianism
While Suzuki criticized the passive nature of So¯to¯ Zen meditation, he seemed at 
first full of praise for the antinomianism of Rinzai Zen. In his widely read Essays 
26. Chanyuan zhuquanji duxu (Chan Prolegomenon), in 
Taisho¯ edition of the Buddhist canon, vol. 48, no. 2015: 
403, in Jeffrey L. Broughton, Zongmi on Chan (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009).
27. Yet even ko¯ans were not sufficient for a Western 
detractor of Chan like Léon Wieger, for whom these 
“incoherent, meaningless answers” were merely “excla-
mations which escaped from the stultified ones, momen-

























33in Zen Buddhism, Suzuki stressed the “spiritual freedom” that rebelled against all 
institutional and routinized practices in the name of pure spontaneity.28 As he 
became more aware of the dangers of antinomianism, presumably in response to 
the initial Western understanding of Zen as a kind of libertarianism (“Beat Zen”), 
Suzuki began to warn against this misinterpretation.29 In an article written in 
1960, he stated that “Zen is decidedly not latitudinarian, nor antinomian.”30 
Manual work and the use of ko¯ans, he wrote, saved Zen “from falling into the 
pitfalls of antinomianism.”31 But a kind of antinomianism can indeed derive from 
the realization of (or simply holding the Chan/Zen belief in) the existence of a 
buddha- nature within oneself. That realization is, properly speaking, what con-
stitutes sudden (or innate) awakening, and it sometimes does lead to the rejection 
of all pious works. One of the founding stories of Chan is that of Bodhidharma’s 
legendary encounter with Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty. When the Chinese 
ruler asked the Indian monk what kind of merits he had accumulated through 
all his pious activities, Bodhidharma is said to have replied that these amounted 
to nothing.
In the Platform Su¯tra of the Sixth Patriarch, the origin of the controversy over 
subitism and gradualism is traced back to verses attributed to Shenxiu (606 – 706) 
and Huineng (d. 713), two disciples of the fifth Chan patriarch Hongren (601 – 74). 
Shenxiu’s verse, expressing his reliance on quietistic meditation, reads:
The body is the bodhi- tree,
The mind is like a clear mirror.
At all times we must strive to polish it,
And must not let the dust collect.
Shenxiu’s verse can be read as a description of gradualist practice in pursuit of 
purity and stillness. Huineng’s verse, on the other hand, is a perfect expression 
of sudden awakening:
Bodhi [awakening] originally has no tree,
The mirror also has no stand.
From the beginning not a thing is.
Where is there room for dust?32
Huineng’s verse implies that no practice whatsoever, meditation included, is 
necessary for those who recognize that their mind is fundamentally pure and 
28. D. T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism (London: Rider, 
1949 – 53), 1:73.
29. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, 2:312.
30. Frederick Franck, ed., The Buddha- Eye: An Anthology 
of the Kyoto School (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 21.
31. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, 3:314 – 15.


















4 empty and, therefore, already enlightened fully.33 Thus, while Shenxiu’s verse 
can be said to represent quietism in the sense of “quiet meditation,” Huineng’s 
verse represents the other side of quietism: namely, antinomianism. The latter 
derives in large part from the understanding of “sudden awakening” as “immedi-
ate,” which is to say unmediated. Whereas traditional Buddhism had emphasized 
“skillful means” (upa¯ya) such as ritual and meditation, the most radical forms of 
“sudden awakening” or subitist Chan reject all such means and proclaim a radical 
antinomianism.
Paradoxically, this subitist viewpoint, traditionally attributed to the South-
ern school, was already that of the purportedly gradualist Northern school. In 
a Northern Chan text, the fourth Chan patriarch Daoxin (580 – 651) is quoted 
as saying, for instance: “In the Great Vehicle [Maha¯ya¯na], the concentration 
in dhya¯na consists in not indulging in spiritual exercises, not examining one’s 
mind, not viewing purity, not contemplating emptiness, not looking far away, 
not looking close up.”34 This antinomian tendency developed in the Hungzhou 
school of Mazu Daoyi (709 – 88). As we have seen, one of Mazu’s most famous 
successors, Linji Yixuan, railed against those “blind shavepates” who, “having 
stuffed themselves with food, sit down to meditate and practice contempla-
tion.” But Linji took the further step of denying the value of any kind of practice 
whatsoever:
Followers of the Way, as to the buddha dharma, no effort is necessary. 
Just be ordinary, with nothing to do —  shit, piss, wear clothes, eat food, 
and lie down when you’re tired.35
I say to you there is no buddha, no dharma, nothing to practice, nothing 
to enlighten to. Just what are you seeking in the highways and byways? 
Blind men! You’re putting a head on top of the one you already have. 
What do yourselves lack?36
Linji’s most extreme antinomianism is reflected in his famous call to spiritual 
murder: “If you meet the Buddha, kill the Buddha!”
At the Council of Tibet, the Chinese monk Moheyan, representing North-
ern Chan subitism, claimed that the buddha- nature (and, consequently, enlighten-
ment) exists fundamentally within each of us and therefore cannot be obtained as 
the result of spiritual exercises. His Indian opponent, Kamalas´ı¯la, summarized as 
33. The contrast between the two positions is reminis-
cent of Henri Suso’s distinction between “prompt con-
version” (den geswinden Ker), which is a sudden “break-
through” (Durchbruch), and slow “reversion” (Widerfluz). 
See Michel de Certeau, La Fable mystique: XVIe– XVIIe siè-
cle (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), 229. On this question, see also 
Paul Demiéville, “The Mirror of the Mind,” in Sudden and 
Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, 
ed. Peter N. Gregory (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 
Press, 1987), 13 – 40.
34. See Faure, Will to Orthodoxy, 59.
35. Sasaki, Record of Linji, 185.
























35follows Moheyan’s position: “By the force of good and bad acts . . . beings wander 
in transmigration, but those who do not think and who do nothing are freed from 
transmigration. . . . Consequently, it is not necessary to think about anything, and 
there is no further need to engage in good practices.”37 Kamalas´ı¯la objected that 
to reject pious practices is to destroy Buddhism. His disciple Jña¯nendra described 
Moheyan’s approach as tantamount to the “passivity of slumber.” It is essentially 
because of its antinomian attitude that Chinese Chan came eventually to be dis-
carded after the Council of Tibet, in favor of a more traditional (and Indian) form 
of Maha¯ya¯na that emphasized the value of pious works.
Judging by a spurious tradition that the Indian master Kamalas´ ı¯la was 
eventually murdered by partisans of Moheyan, the stakes of that debate were 
clearly high, even if they were probably as political as they were doctrinal. They 
appear also to have been ethical: not only did Chan antinomianism reject pious 
works, it also seemed to lend itself to moral laxity. Many Chan Buddhist monks 
became infamous as wine- drinking, brothel- going eccentrics; and similar figures 
can be found in Korea and Japan. The trend toward “wild” or “mad” Chan is well 
reflected in monastic trickster figures, who, because their focus is on ultimate 
truth, no longer feel obliged to follow Buddhist precepts and, instead, advocate 
a radical form of quietism in which pious works, rituals, and even meditation are 
unnecessary. Given the constraints of Asian societies, their antinomianism was 
in most cases bound to remain largely rhetorical and theoretical. The madness of 
certain monks came to be perceived as feigned —  a manifestation of ideological 
chic or a literary topos. In medieval Japan, the antinomian tendency was repre-
sented by the so- called Bodhidharma school (Daruma- shu¯), which Do¯gen terms 
the “naturalist heresy” (  jinen gedo¯). Perhaps the most popular trickster figure in 
Zen is So¯jun Ikkyu¯ (1394 – 1481), a poet- monk famous for his love affair with a 
blind singer and for the erotic poetry that she inspired him to compose.
Outside of Chan and Zen, an antinomian tendency is found in the hongaku 
(or “fundamental awakening”) tenet of Tendai Buddhism. It was doubts about 
that cardinal tenet that, we are told, incited the young Do¯gen to leave the Tendai 
headquarters near Kyoto and to go to China in search of an answer —  which 
came to him in the form of Caodong Chan. More recently, hongaku thought has 
been the object of violent criticism on the part of the “Critical Buddhism” move-
ment (hihan bukkyo¯). Because of its innate conservatism, its satisfaction with our 
brave old world, hongaku thought was deemed to be the source of all the evils 
that afflicted premodern Japanese society (and, in particular, its injustice toward 
outcastes). But the diametrically opposed theory, that of karmic causality, could 
equally lead to the same kinds of discriminatory notions and behaviors.
37. See Joseph F. Roccasalvo, “The Debate at bSam yas: 
A Study in Religious Contrast and Correspondence,” Phi-


















One aspect of Buddhist quietism and antinomianism, though rarely found 
in comparative discussions of quietism (and conspicuously absent from Zen belief 
and practice), bears a superficial resemblance to Christian devotion. There is a 
devotional tendency found in the cult of the Buddha Amita¯bha (or, in Japanese, 
Amida). The Japanese Pure Land schools, in particular, advocate a pure faith 
in Amida and total surrender to his power. While the notion of “Other Power” 
(tariki) is usually contrasted with the Zen reliance on one’s “own power” (  jiriki), 
in practice these two approaches lead to similar kinds of antinomianism —  the 
rejection of pious works and traditional cults —  and it is on this ground that both 
the Bodhidharma school and the Pure Land schools were attacked by the Bud-
dhist establishment.
3. Conclusion
Thus some aspects of Buddhism are comparable, but only in a vague and dis-
tant way, to aspects of the quietism advocated by Molinos, Madame Guyon, and 
Fénelon. Clearly, however, the “no- thought” of Chan is not the “blank slate” of 
Christian Quietism, on which God engraves his will and blessings. Nor does 
Buddhist quietism lead to the extasis of mystical union. Even in Tantric or eso-
teric Buddhism, where the priest becomes one with the buddhas and the gods 
whom he has ritually invoked, we are not dealing with extasis but with a concen-
tration in which the self momentarily disappears.
Both Western and neo- Confucian criticisms of Buddhist quietism presup-
pose that the contemplative life of the Buddhist monk is negatively antisocial 
and leads to eccentric behavior, moral laxity, and even antinomianism. Admit-
tedly, such elements can be found, to one degree or another, in various Buddhist 
trends —  especially in Chan or Zen —  even if they do not play the same role in 
Buddhism as they do in Christian Quietism. This sort of critique, however, does 
not do justice to Buddhism generally, and certainly not to Chinese Buddhism: 
the dialectic of “quiescence” and “movement” had been too integral a part of 
traditional Chinese thought for any religious stream (whether Buddhist, Dao-
ist, or Confucianist) to depart significantly from it. In some cases, moreover, 
the charges leveled at Buddhism could be leveled at neo- Confucianism as well. 
The quietist tendencies of neo- Confucianism were indeed denounced by leading 
mainstream Confucianists such as Wang Tingxiang (1474 – 1544) and Yan Yuan 
(1635 – 1704).38 If the neo- Confucianists tried so hard to distinguish their jing-
zuo or “quiet sitting” from Buddhist seated meditation (zuochan), that is because 
the Buddhist and neo- Confucian practices looked, and indeed were, strikingly 
38. On this question, see Jacques Gernet, L’Intelligence de 
























37similar. Even Zhu Xi (1130 – 1200), the staunchest neo- Confucian critic of Bud-
dhism, recognized the similarities. Still, jingzuo was, paradoxically, most popular 
among orthodox traditionalists.39 Moreover, the antinomian tendencies of neo-
 Confucianism, in particular of the Taizhou school, resembled those of Chan 
Buddhism. The Taizhou scholar Li Zhi (1527 – 1602), for instance, rejected all 
external and internal constraints in the name of pure spontaneity (and died by 
suicide in 1602, while imprisoned).
Notwithstanding their affinities and similarities, Buddhists responded to 
their neo- Confucian critics by emphasizing the value of Buddhist rituals for the 
protection of the state and its ruler. Indeed, Buddhism was perceived by East Asian 
rulers mainly as an ideological weapon and only secondarily as a soteriological 
doctrine. In medieval Japan, Buddhist monasteries became large landholders and 
were actively involved in the civil wars that ravaged the country from the four-
teenth century to the sixteenth. “Warrior monks” formed bands that attacked all 
who threatened their interests, and they had finally to be exterminated before the 
country could be reunified under Tokugawa rule in the seventeenth century. No 
one was complaining about Buddhist quietism then.
Monks also played a more positive social role, for instance by running hos-
pices and leproseries, taking care of the dying, and dealing with the pollution of 
death through their funerary rituals. Zen monasteries were culturally and diplo-
matically active. Tenryu¯ji, for instance, was the monastery in charge of trade with 
China, while Nanzenji, in the person of its abbot Ishin Su¯den (1569 – 1633), acted 
as mediator in diplomatic relations between the bakufu (the military government 
of Japan), Ming China, and the kingdoms of Siam and Nova Hispania.40 In reac-
tion to the traditional image of Buddhism as an antisocial teaching, there have 
been attempts to delineate an “engaged Buddhism”; and since the nineteenth cen-
tury, it has often become identified with emergent nationalisms. The active role 
of Buddhists in nationalist and ethnic causes has gone so far that in Sri Lanka, for 
instance, monks as well as Buddhist laymen have taken up arms.
The term quietism is fundamentally ambivalent and has been used to des-
ignate an “obscure object of desire” (or of aversion). While its referent seems 
vague and fluctuating, the experience of quietism seems a relatively constant and 
vital feature of varieties of mysticism. Behind the negative rhetoric, the discourse 
about quietism involves epistemological, soteriological, and other philosophical 
39. It should be noted that meditation has never been the 
single paradigmatic practice of Buddhism. Many monks 
did not (and do not today) practice any form of medita-
tion, perceiving it as a specialized activity, like asceticism, 
thaumaturgy, and scholarship. The Biographies of Eminent 
Monks, for instance, are divided into a number of rubrics, 
and “practitioners of meditation” is only one of them. 
See John Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk: Buddhist Ideals 
in Medieval Chinese Hagiography (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 1997).
40. See Shintei Honko¯ kokushi nikki (Chronicles of National 
Master Honko¯), 7 vols. (Tokyo: Zoku gunsho ruiju¯ kan-

















8 issues that seem anything but obsolete. Moreover, as William James suggested, 
quietism is or can be a “healthy- minded” attitude toward reality. Inasmuch as 
quietism holds up an ideal of peaceful detachment to a time when hustle and 
bustle threaten individuality and individual freedom, we can only hope that 
it will remain —  or become again —  an essential component of religions like 
Buddhism.
